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PRACTITIONER'S ESSAY
Liability of Issuer's Counsel in
the Wake of Central Bank ofDenver
To Whom Is the Lawyer's
Due Diligence Due?

-

BY BARRY D. HuNTER
Carolyn Counseloris a lawyer who has been hiredby IsadorIssuer
to assist in thepreparationofsecuritiesofferingdocuments. Isadorplans
to raiseone million dollarsfromprivateinvestors tofinance thepurchase
of yearling thoroughbreds, which he plans to raise into champion
racehorses.
As is customarypracticeforthe securitiesbar,CarolynalertsIsador
ofhis risk ofsecuritiesfraudliabilityto the investorsifhefails to disclose
allmaterialcircumstancespertinentto, andriss entailedby, the venture.
Carolynfurther advises Isador that his disclosure obligation will likely
extend not only to thosefacts ofwhich he is aware,butfurther to allfacts
that a due diligence investigation would reveal. Carolyn also offers to
undertake the due diligence investigation and to hire the experts
necessary to adequatelyperform thejob.
Isador tells Carolyn that he cannot afford the substantial costs
entailedby the investigationsheproposes.At the same time, he assures
herthat because ofhis extensive experience in horse training,he already
is quite knowledgeable about the proposedventure. After reiteratingto
Isadorthe liabilityrisks he incurs by not exercising more extensive due
diligence, and after documenting her warnings in writing, Carolyn
proceeds to draft the offenng documents based on the informationIsador
provides to her Isadorthen uses those documents to raisehis investment
capital.
Unbeknownstto Carolyn,Isadorhadvirtually no experience in horse
training,and the information he supplied to Carolynfor insertion in the
offeringdocuments thatshe draftedwas incompleteandmisleading.After
the venture collapsesandIsadoris leftpenniless as a result, the investors
have only one way to recovertheir losses. They assert a securitiesfraud
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claim underSection 10(b) ofthe SecuritiesExchangeAct againstCarolyn
for her role in conveying the misleading informationthey reliedupon in
investing with Isador
Carolyn at all times gave the proper advice to her client, and she
properly documented thatadvice. Moreover,while she may have drafted
the offering documents, the misleading information contained in those
documents was providedto her by Isador-and it was Isadorwho signed
the documents and delivered them to the investors. Nonetheless, as this
Essay concludes, Carolynshould hire a good lawyer
INTRODUCrION

ection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Section
10(b)")' provides the statutory underpinnings for most of the
federal securities fraud lawsuits filed in tlus country. Defendants
who act deliberately or recklessly in misstating material facts are held
liable under Section 10(b) when others have relied on these misstatements
in purchasing or selling securities. Before the United States Supreme
Court's decision in CentralBank ofDenverNA. v. FirstInterstateBankof
Denver N.A., 2 investors typically asserted Section 10(b) claims against
anyone and everyone involved in providing information concerning a failed
corporate venture.
One group of defendants against whom such claims frequently had
been asserted were securities professionals such as attorneys, accountants,
and underwriters who were retained to help their issuer clients prepare the
offering documents used to sell securities. The typical securities clain
sought to hold the issuer primarily liable for having made the
misrepresentations alleged to appear in the offering documents and the
retainedprofessionals secondarily liable for having aided and abetted inthe
preparation of those documents.
In CentralBank ofDenver, the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b)
"prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the
commission ofthe manipulative act."3 By adoptingthis interpretation of the
statute, the Court specifically eliminated private actions predicated on
aiding and abetting another party's fraudulent misrepresentations. 4
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§ 78j (1994)).

2 Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver N.A., 511

U.S. 164 (1994).
31Id. at

164.

4Seeid. at 171.
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CentralBankofDenver mitialy was hailed (or assailed) as a decision
that would dramatically reduce the risks of liability for lawyers hired to
help their clients prepare securities offering documents. With the limited
exception of formal opinions specifically attributable to and signed by the
securities lawyer, statements in the offering documents are made by the
issuer - not by the attorneys who merely assisted in their preparation.
Therefore, it was widely believed that the elimination of aiding-andabetting claims under Section 10(b) would drastically curtail attorney
liability.
Largely overlooked m the optimism of the securities bar (and the
pessimism of the plaintiffs' bar) was the warning with winch the majority
opinion in CentralBank ofDenver concluded:
The absence of § 1Ob-5 aiding and abetting liability does not mean that
secondary actors m the securities market are always free from liability
under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer,
accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a
material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 1Ob-5, assuming
all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 1Ob-5 are met. In
any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple
5
violators
Ths language was taken to mean only that professionals issuing their own
opinions (for example, accountants who certify financial statements or
lawyers who issue formal opinion letters) would continue to be liable under
Section 10(b) as primary violators where their signed statements were
disseminated to the investing public. It was not widely anticipated that the
courts would extend primary Section 10(b) liability to securities lawyers
who merely drafted their clients' offering documents, winch would require
the courts to conclude that the attorney/scriveners themselves made the
representations contained in these documents.
Of course, if courts extend primary liability to attorneys, CentralBank
ofDenver will not have the anticipated effect of decreasing the potential for
attorney liability. Lawyers formerly sued for having aided and abetted their
clients in making misstatements or omissions contained in the offering
documents will now be sued for having themselves made the misstatements
or omissions.6 Indeed, because several courts have concluded that aider and
Ild.

6 According

to SEC Chairman Levitt, "[t]he extent to which the CentralBank
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abetter liability requires a hugher degree of scienter than primary Section
10(b) liability, lawyers' exposure to Section 10(b) liability after Central
Bank ofDenver might even increase if courts permit clais previously
brought against attorneys for aiding and abetting to be repackaged as
primary claims.
Part I ofthis Essay examines judicial precedents -both before and after
CentralBank ofDenver - on the issue of whether attorneys for the issuer
can be held primarily liable under Section 10(b) for statements they draft
for their clients. Part II examines recent decisions involving common law
negligence claims by investors against an issuer's counsel. It concludes that
courts that are willing to impose primary Section 10(b) liability on lawyers
who merely draft their clients' offering documents will also be likely to
find that those lawyers can be liable to investors for sunple negligence in
failing to detect and correct misstatements or omissions m those
documents. Finally, Part III examines the policy arguments that underlie
judicial decisions m this area. It concludes that how the courts view the
scope of securities lawyers' due diligence obligations - and to whom the
lawyers owe those due diligence obligations - will largely determine the
outcome of future Section 10(b) and common law negligence claims
brought by investors against attorneys who draft offering documents.
I. CASES ADDRESSING ATTORNEY LiABiLrrY

FOR

MISSTATEMENTS IN THEIR CLIENTS' OFFERING DOCUMENTS

A. Pre-Central Bank of Denver Decisions
A number of courts have addressed whether attorneys alleged to have
knowingly or recklessly prepared materially misleading solicitation
documents in connection with a securities offering may be held liable for
primary violations of Section 10(b). They have come to widely disparate
conclusions.
ofDenverdecision will impact private rights of action is difficult to predict. Many
clais that formerly were charged as aiding and abetting are now being recast m
terms of primary liability." ConcerningLitigation Under the FederalSecurities
Laws: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications & Finance,House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (testimony of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter ConcerningLitigation Under the FederalSecurities
Laws].
7 See, e.g., ]IT an Int'l Inv Trust v Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 924-25 (2d Cir.
1980); Woodward v. MetroBank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975).
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At one end of the spectrum are cases imposing primary liability on
lawyers who issue formal opinion letters used to promote the sale of
securities. In these situations, courts almost consistently have concluded
that, because the statements in the opinion letters are expressly attributable
to the lawyers who sign them, the attorneys may be held liable as primary
10(b)5 violators if their opinions contain materially nsleading statements
of fact.'
At the other end of the spectrum are cases where the attorneys perform
legal services totally unrelatedto the preparation of documents used in the
solicitation of the securities transactions. In these cases courts have almost
consistently concluded that lawyers cannot be held primarily liable for
failing to disclose to investors what they knew or should have known about
their clients' affairs. The court in Schatz v. Rosenberg9 explained the basis
for tins conclusion:
[L]awyers do not vouch for the probity of their clients when they draft
documents reflecting their clients' promises, statements or warranties.
Thus,
[a lawyer's] alleged transmission of
[his client's]
misrepresentations does not transform those misrepresentations into those
of
[the lawyer]
[A] lawyer or law firm cannot be liable for the
representations of a client, even if the lawyer incorporates the client's
misrepresentations into legal documents or agreements necessary for
closing the transaction.'0
Numerous courts have refused to find attorneys liable in this context,
reasoning that to do so would convert a lawyer's duty from client advocate
to public whistle-blower."
8 See,

e.g., Kline v. First W Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994);
Ackerman v Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991); Cronin v. Midwestem
Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489
F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); In re American Continental Corp./Lmcoln Sav. & Loan
See. Litig., 794 F Supp. 1424 (D. Arm. 1992); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Env't &
Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Morganv. Prudential Group, Inc.,
527 F Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983).
9 Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943
F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
'1Od. at 495.
11See Barkerv. Henderson Franklin Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,495-96 (7th
Cir. 1986) (stating duty to blow whistle is not found m Section 10(b)); In re
Cascade Int'l See. Litig., 840 F Supp. 1558, 1575-76 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (same);
Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., 840 F Supp. 799, 808 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding law firm
has no duty to "tattle" on its client); Agapitos v PCM Inv Co., 809 F Supp. 939,
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Where the documents that attorneys have drafted for their clients are
securities offering documents usedto solicit investors, the courts have been
less protective of an issuer's counsel's right to preserve client confidences.
The very courts that have so conclusively opmed that lawyers cannot be
held liable for misrepresentations or omissions contained in the documents
they draft for their clients have been far less uniform when offering
documents used to solicit investors are involved. In Schatz, for example,
the court expressly noted that the lawyers "did not solicit
any purchase of
2
documents."'
solicitation
any
prepare
or
securities
Many courts before CentralBank ofDenver rejected primary Section
10(b) claims against lawyers by concluding that lawyers do not vouch for
the probity of securities offering documents any more than any other
documents they draft for their clients. About as many other courts deciding
the issue before CentralBank ofDenver concluded that lawyers drafting
offering documents for their clients' signature did undertake special duties
to investors that could make them primarily responsible under Section
10(b) for misstatements or omissions in those documents.
1. Cases Holding That Attorneys Drafting Offering
DocumentsAre Not PrimaryParticipantsin the
Misstatements or Omissions Containedin Those Documents
In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,13 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held as a matter of law that the plaintiff
bondholders had no Rule 10(b)5 claim against the underwriter's law firm.
The court characterized the plaintiffs' allegations as attempting to impose
on the law firm "a duty to correct [its clients'] false statements' 4 and
rejected the existence of such a duty s The Abell court explained:
Traditionally, lawyers are accountable only to their clients for the
sufficiency of their legal opinions. It is well understood in the legal
community that any significant increase in attorney liability to third947 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (citing Schatz v Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991)).
12 Schatz, 943 F.2d at 492 (emphasis added); see also Barker, 797 F.2d at 493
(recognizing that the firm "had never reviewed or approved any of the materials
used to sell the securities"); In re Cascade,840 F Supp. at 1564 (recognizing that
the lawyers had never actively solicited or prepared solicitation documents in
connection with their clients' offering).
3 Abell v Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988).
14 1d.
at 1125 n.22.
"See id. at 1126.
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parties could have a dramatic effect upon our entire system of legal ethics.
An attorney required by law to disclose "material facts" to third-parties
might thus breach hIs or her duty, required by good ethical standards, to
keep attorney-client confidences. Similarly, an attorney required to
declare publicly hIs or her legal opinion of a client's actions and
statements may find it impossible to remain as loyal to the client as legal
ethics properly require. 16
Following the Fifth Circuit's lead, the district court in Buford White
Lumber Co. Profit Sharing and Savings Plan & Trust v. Octagon
Properties,Ltd.,"7 analyzed lawyers' duties to disclose misstatements or
omissions in the offering documents they draft for their clients' use in
selling securities. Recogmzing that silence is not actionable under Section
10(b) in the absence of a duty to speak, the Buford court concluded that
such a duty would anse only ifthe lawyer had made affirmative statements
by way of a formal opinion that the lawyer had himself signed.
Similarly, in Friedmanv. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd.,"8 the court
held that a lawyer's involvement in the drafting process does not make the
lawyer the issuer ofthe statements nor impose duties on the lawyer to ferret
out any misstatements the offering documents might contain. "[C]ounsel
who merely draft [an offering memorandum] cannot be held liable for the
general statements in the offering memorandum not specifically attributed
to them."19
2. CasesHolding ThatAttorneys Drafi'ng
Offering Documents Are PrimaryParticipants
While the foregoing authorities establish a considerable body of
precedent for the proposition that attorneys are not primarily liable under
16
Id. at 1124.
17Buford White

Lumber Co. Profit Sharing and Say. Plan & Trust v Octagon
Properties, Ltd., 740 F Supp. 1553 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
1 Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd., 730 F Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y
1990), a~fd sub nom., Friedman v. Arizona World, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991).
19 Id. at 533. See also Austin v. Bradley, Barry & Tarlow, P.C., 836 F Supp.
36, 38-39 (D. Mass. 1993) (refusing to npose duty upon attorney to disclose
negative facts thatwere material to statements m the prospectus the attorney helped
draft, finding that to impose such a duty would conflict with attorney's duty to
client); Kenney v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 1992 WL 551108, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (stating lawyer's drafting of the offering documents does not amount to
making representation attributable to the lawyer; instead, the lawyer could face
liability only for legal opinions directly attributable to him).
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Section 10(b) for misstatements contained in the offering documents they
draft for their clients, an equally substantial body of authority - including
cases in the Sixth Circuit - is to the contrary These courts hold that
attorneys, merely by drafting their clients' offering documents, undertake
duties of disclosure to investors and, thus, can be primarily liable under
Section 10(b). The courts reach this result by finding either that the
lawyers: (1) have themselves made the representations contained m the
offering documents or (2) have undertaken a reasonable due diligence
investigation of the information provided by the client for inclusion in
these documents.
The Sixth Circuit cases have employed the former approach. In
MolecularTechnology Corp. v. Valentine, ° the court held that an attorney

who drafted ins clients' offering documents could be liable as a primary
Section 10(b) violator for failing to disclose negative information that he
knew (or was reckless m not knowing) about ins client. According to the
Molecular Technology Court, "'[a] person undertaking to furnish rnformation"' assumes an affirmative duty to disclose, the breach of wich
subjects hunto primary Section 10(b) liability 21And because a lawyer who
drafts a prospectus undertakes to "furnish information," he can be liable as
a primary Section 10(b) violator if the statements he drafts contain misstatements or onussions. 2 Commentators have recognized that Molecular
Technology states the most expansive test of primary attorney liability
under Section 10(b):
I'd like to make a comment on the Molecular Technology v. Valentine

case. There the Sixth Circuit made an unusual statement with respect
to primary liability. The Sixth Circuit said that primary liability can be
imposed upon one who furmshes information to others, such as investors.
And inthat opinion, the Sixth Circuit asserted that a law firm, by drafting
a prospectus, in effect, furmshes information to investors and can be held
liable on primary liability grounds, making it unnecessary to go to an
aiding and abetting analysis. I find this far reaching. It is more far
reaching than any other appellate court decision that I have read on this
subject.23
20 Molecular

Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 917 (quoting SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218,223
(6th Cir. 1982)).
2 See id. at 918.
1 Mark I. Steinberg (panel member), Corporate Securities Law: An Ohio
21

Perspective, Presentations and Panel Discussion at the University of Cincinnati
College ofLaw's Sixth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: ContemporaryIssues
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Lower courts within the Sixth Circuit have followed Molecular
Technology's expansive view.'
Various courts outside the Sixth Circuit have concluded that, by
undertaking to draft solicitation documents for their clients, attorneys
undertake a primary Section 10(b) duty to investors to disclose material
facts. In Felts v. National Accounts Systems Ass'n,25 for example, the
attorney defendant was both an officer/director of the seller and the
attorney responsible for drafting the offering documents. As an
officer/director and signatory of the offering documents, the defendant
could have been heldprimarily liable for misstatements m those documents
irrespective of his role as counsel. The Felts court, however, held the
defendant primarily liable under Section 10(b) because of ins reckless or
knowing incorporation of misstatements in the offering documents he
drafted as the company's lawyer. The Felts court stated: "The duty of the
lawyer includes the obligation to exercise due diligence, including
reasonable inquiry, in connection with responsibilities he has voluntarily
' The attorney's failure to undertake such inquiry, the court
undertaken."26
reasoned, made him responsible as a primary Section 10(b) violator for
misstatements contained in the offering documents.27
Koehler v. Pulvers8 also asserted the existence of a duty by counsel
drafting offering documents to investigate the offering, the breach ofwhich
created primary liability under Section 10(b). Relying, like Felts, upon the
duties of inquiry and disclosure arising out of the securities lawyers' role
in his client's offering,29 the Koehlercourt held that the attorney's failure
in SecuritiesRegulations (Mar. 12, 1993), in 62 U. CIN.L.REV 533, 555 (1993).
24 See In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F Supp. 1239, 1250 (W.D. Mich.)
(preparing a prospectus "certainly qualifies as 'furishing' or 'supplying'
information to potential investors m a sufficiently direct manner to imposes 10(b)
liability") (quoting Mercerv. Jaffe, Smder, Raitt &Heuer, 713 F Supp. 1019, 1025
(W.D.Mich. 1989)), affd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991). The court in Mercer
found that an attorney who had "assisted" in preparing an offering circular and had
taken an "active role" in approving advertising literature could be liable as a
primary Section 10(b) violatorbecause he had undertaken to "furnish information."
Mercer, 713 F Supp.at 1019, 1022, 1025.
15 Felts v. National Accounts Sys. Ass'n, 469 F Supp. 54 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
6Id. at 67
27 See id.
28 Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F Supp. 829 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
29 See id. at 845.
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to conduct a reasonable investigation of the offering documents he drafted,
and his resulting failure to correct misstatements contained in those
documents, constituted an actionable primary representation."
B. AuthoritiesPost-CentralBank of Denver
Had CentralBankofDenver been followed by a clear line of authority
limiting professional liability under Section 10(b) to cases where
statements are directly attributable to the professionals, the pre-Central
Bank ofDenver cases could be explained by judicial inattentiveness to the
line demarcating primary from secondary Section 10(b) liability 3 1
However, in the two post-CentralBank of Denver cases to address the
issue, the courts have held that attorneys who merely draft their clients'
offering documents can be liable under Section 10(b). In Employers
Insuranceof Wausauv. Musick Peeler& Garrett,32 the court squarely held
that attorneys who draft offering documents for their clients can be
3oSee

id., see also Siedel v. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 616 F Supp.
1342, 1362 (D.N.H. 1985) (finding attorney who failed to conduct necessary due
diligence investigation of the information contained m the offering documents that
he prepared to be a primary participant under Section 10(b) for the misstatements
in those documents). Other courts have similarly found that attorneys who draft
offering documents owe a duty ofdisclosure to investors and have accordingly held
that those attorneys can be primarily liable under Section 10(b) for misstatements
or omissions m the offering documents they draft. See In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig.,
1990 WL 132715, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 1990); Cohen v. Goodfliend, 665 F
Supp. 152, 156-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Ahearn v. Gaussom, 611 F Supp. 1465, 1489
(D. Or. 1985).
3 As SEC Chairman Levitt explained:
[T]he line separating primary and secondary liability [is not clear primarily]
because the distinction seldom had any practical significance before the
CentralBank of Denver decision. Persons who aided and abetted a fraud
were held jointly and severally liable with primary violators in private
actions
ConcerningLitigation under the FederalSecurities Laws, supranote 6, at *8-9.
See also Anixter v. Home Stake Prod., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 n.8 (10th Cir. 1996)
("Commentators have long recogmzedvaganes mtheborders betweenprimary and
secondary liability. CentralBank ofDenver requires courts to delineate primary
liability much more clearly." (citations omitted)).
32 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 871 F Supp. 381,
389 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
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primarily liable under Section 10(b) for misstatements or omissions m
those documents. Similarly, m lein v. Boyd,3 3 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that attorneys are not liable under Section 10(b) unless the
misstatements or omissions appear in opinions that they have themselves
issued and signed. The court concluded that attorneys who do not issue or
sign offering documents "may be liable for a primary violation of Section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 when the [lawyer's] participation in the creation of
a statement containing a misrepresentation or omission of material fact is
sufficiently significant that the statement can properly be attributed to the
[lawyer] as its author or co-author."34
The majority of the cases addressing the scope of professional liability
under Section 10(b) post-Central Bank of Denver have involved
accountants. The two circuit courts to address the issue of whether Section
10(b) liability can be premised upon an accountant's mere assistance in the
preparation of his clients' offering documents have taken divergent views.
In In re Software Toolworks, Inc.,"5 the Ninth Circuit stated that an
accountant could be held primarily liable under Section 10(b) for
misrepresentations contained in his clients' letter to the SEC if the
accountant played a "significant role" in drafting the letter. Conversely, in
Anzxter v. Home-Stake ProductionCo., 6 the Tenth Circuit declared that the
offending statement must have been made by the accountant rather than by
ins client, and it disapproved, as mconsistent with CentralBankofDenver,
decisions (including Software Toolworks, Inc.) that "allow liability to
attach without requiring a representation to be made by [the CPA]
defendant. 317
The district courts that have addressed the issue of accountant liability
under Section 10(b) post-CentralBank of Denver have similarly split m
8 the court held that
their holdings. InIn re ZZZZBest SecuritiesLitigation,"
it was not necessary for investors to know that statements in the offering
13 Klein v. Boyd, 1998 WL 55245, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998), rev'g 1996
WL 67554, at *25-27 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1996).
1 Id. at * 12. The court m In re Towers Fin. Corp.NoteholdersLitig., 1995 WL
571888, at *18 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 20, 1995), also held that issuer's counsel who had
no "direct communication" with the investor plaintiffs owed no Section 10(b) duty
disclosure to them; however, in Towers the lawyers did not prepare any offering
documents used to solicit investors.
35In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994).
36 Anlxter
v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996).
37
Id. at 1226 n.10.
38 In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
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documents are attributable to the accountant; instead, where the accountant
was "intricately involved" m the preparation of solicitation documents, it
was up to the accountant to ensure that the statements contained in those
documents were correct.39
Other courts have read CentralBank ofDenver to foreclose Section
10(b) liability for accountants who merely review and approve their clients'
offering documents but, at the same time, have indicated that liability
might still attach where the accountant had "assisted m the drafting" of the
documents. °
Finally, in PicardChemical,Inc. ProfitSharingPlan v. Pemgo Co.,41
the court stated that after CentralBank ofDenver an accountant's liability
under Section 10(b) for misstatements or omissions would necessarily
require those statements to have been made by the accountant. However,
by citing O'Neil v. Appel,42 the Picardcourt left some doubt as to whether
it would consider statements draftedby accountants to be made by them.43
The lack of clear judicial direction on the scope of Section 10(b)
professional liability after Central Bank ofDenver - and the possibility
that even courts that limit Section 10(b) liability to those who "make"
the statements would find liability where professional defendants assist
in the drafting of those statements - is further demonstrated in the

underwriter context. Some courts have held that claims for primary
Section 10(b) violations can be asserted against underwriters in the wake
of Central Bank of Denver merely based upon participation in the
issuance of their clients' prospectus. 4 In Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody &
39 Id.at 970;

see alsoAdam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F Supp. 1398,
1401 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("significant assistance" by CPA in preparing solicitation
documents is sufficient to establish apnmary violation of Section 10(b)); Cashman
v. Coopers &Lybrand, 877 F Supp. 425,432-34 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (same).
4' O'Neil v. Appel, 897 F Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Mich. 1995); see also In re
Kendall Square Research Corp. See. Litig., 868 F Supp. 26,28 (D. Mass. 1994)
(stating that merely reviewing and approving quarterly financial statements does
not constitute making a material misstatement).
41 Picard Chem., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Pemgo Co., 940 F Supp. 1101,
1119 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
42 O'Neil v. Appel, 897 F Supp. 995 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
43See

PicardChem., Inc., 940 F Supp. at 1120.
"See In re USA Classic Sec. Litig., 1995 WL 363841, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
In re College Bound Consol. Litig., 1994 WL 172408, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that primary violations can be established where underwriters eithermake
the allegedly offending statement or disseminate the statements of others). But see
In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F Supp. 974, 986-87 (E.D.N.Y.
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Co., 4S while the court agreed that to subject an underwriter to primary

Section 10(b) liability the underwriter must have himself made the
statements in the offering documents, the court reasoned that an
underwriter can make a statement m the offering documents merely by
drafting or helping to draft the documents for the issuer.
In sum, many courts addressing Section 10(b) claims against
professionals post-Central Bank of Denver appear ready to view a
professional who merely assists the issuer/client in preparing offering
documents as the "maker" of the representations and omissions contained
in those documents in order to sustain Section 10(b) claims against the
professional.
II. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CASES

Review ofthe decisions addressing common law negligence clais by
investors against attorneys who have drafted their clients' offering
documents further suggests that Central Bank of Denver might prove
insignificant in stemming the tide of attorney liability Case law within the
Sixth Circuit and elsewhere supports the proposition that attorneys can be
liable for simple negligence - separate from their liability to investors
under Section 10(b) - for failing to insure the accuracy of the statements
contained in the offering documents they draft. Ultimately, a court's
resolution of such a common law claim will be determined, as in the
Section 10(b) context, by whether the court believes that attorneys owe
duties to investors merely by virtue of drafting securities offering
documents.
In Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine,' for example, the
investor plaintiffs sued the issuer's lawyer for negligent misrepresentation
under Michigan law as well as under Section 10(b). Noting that under
Michigan law an attorney owes duties not only to his clients but also to
third parties whose reliance on the attorney's representations is directly
foreseeable, the Molecular Technology court held that investors could
assert common law negligence claims against attorneys for
misrepresentations contained in offering documents they draft for their
clients. 47
1985) (holding that participation by the underwriter m the drafting and circulation
of the prospectus does not create a primary Section 10(b) violation).
"5Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F Supp. 303, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y
1996), afd, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997).
4Molecular Tech.

Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 911 (6th Cir. 1991).

47 See id. at 919. The exposure of securities lawyers to negligent misrepre-
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A growing number of courts have held that professionals, including
lawyers, can be liable to non-clients for nsstatements they negligently
make. Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts so provides,48 and
a number of states, including Kentucky, 9 have held section 552 applicable
to lawyers. If those courts further accept the proposition (accepted by the
Sixth Circuit mMolecular Technology and in the various other cases cited
above) that lawyers make the representations contained in the offering
documents they draft, securities lawyers will face significant exposure in
common law claims for negligent misrepresentation. °
sentation claims under Michigan law was limited (but not eliminated) by the district
court's holding in In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F Supp. 1239, 1250 (W.D.
Mich.), affd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991). Distinguishing the offering at issue
in Molecular Technology (which involved a limited group of private investors)
from the situation at bar in Rospatch (which involved a public offering), the
Rospatch court held that negligence claims against an issuer's counsel could not be
extended to the potentially unlimited group of investors involved in a public
offering. See id. at 1260-61. Notably, however, the Rospatch court, like the
Molecular Technology court, had no problem with the notion that lawyers who
merely draft offering documents for their clients' signatures could be held liable
as having made the misrepresentations.
48 Section 552(1) provides:
One who, m the course of his business, profession or employment, orimany
other transaction in which he has a pecumary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecumary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
49See Seigle
v. Jasper, 867 S.W.2d 476,482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
0 Section 552(2) provides an unportant limitation to the group of potential
investor plaintiffs:
[T]he liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a)-(b) (1977). Application of section
552 to investor claims against an issuer's counsel might well lead to limitations
similar to those adopted in the Rospatch case. See Rospatch, 760 F Supp. at 126061, see also Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 21 (Wash. 1990) (holding
section 552 claims against securities counsel do not extend to general investing
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An alternative, albeit closely related, basis under wich attorneys who
draft their clients' offering documents may be held liable for sinple
negligence to investors is the tort of attorney malpractice. A malpractice
clann provides a potentially broader basis for liability because it, more
readily than the tort of negligent misrepresentation, encompasses liability
for omissions as well as afimative misstatements.
In many states, again including Kentucky," attorney malpractice
claims can be asserted by non-clients against attorneys for the negligent
provision of services to clients that the attorneys ought reasonably to have
known would be relied upon by those third parties, to their detriment. In
California, the courts have specifically held that attorneys who counsel
their clients in structuring their securities offerings owe duties to the
investors to competently perform those services.
InRonson v. Sheppard,Mullin, Richter & Hampton,52 for example, the
plaintiffs were limited partners in a dissolved California limited
partnership. They brought professional negligence claims against
partnership counsel retained to prepare certain disclosure documents
designed to satisfy the general partners' fiduciary duty of full disclosure of
material information to limited partners. 53 In reversing the lower court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants, the
appellate court concluded that triable issues of fact remained on the
question of whether, under the circumstances presented, the attorney
defendants owed a duty of care toward the limited partners.' In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted that the attorney defendants were retained
public).
51Kentucky law permits non-clients to bring malpractice claims against lawyers
for more than just misrepresentations. The determining factor is whether the nonclient was "'intended to be benefitted by"' the lawyer's services. Hill v. Willmott,
561 S.W.2d 331,334 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App.
769, 771 (1971)) (recognizing principle, though refusing to extend third-party
standing to an adversary in litigation to sue a lawyer for failing to investigate the

claim that the lawyer brought against it); see also Sparks v. Craft, 75 F.3d 257, 261
(6th Cir. 1996) (stating that a lawyer can be liable to intended third-party
beneficiary for negligent handling of a lawsuit). It remains to be determined how
broadly Kentucky courts will construe this expansion of attorney malpractice
liability beyond the attorney's clients.
52 Ronsonv. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter& Hampton, 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 325
(Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1994).
53 See id. at *29-30.
' See id. at *44.
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for the purpose of preparing documentation sufficient to satisfy their
clients' duty of full disclosure of material information to the limited
partners."5 Under these circumstances, the court determined, the attorneys'
representation was for the purpose of achieving a goal common to the
partnership and the limited partners, thereby rendering the two
representations related:
Here the attorneys ghost-wrote the documents for the general partner, and
thus did not intentionally induce knowing reliance on their participation
in the transhction. Even so, ifthere are other factors leading to an implied
attorney-client relationship, where the attorney has knowledge regarding
the purpose of lis or her work product, a duty may be established to those
whose conduct has been influenced. In such a case, an attorney may owe
a plaintiff a duty of care where the 'end and aim' of the attorney's advice,
even to another, isto induce plaintiff's reliance on it.56
Similarly, in Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler &
Garrett,7 attorneys retained to help their issuer/client prepare offering
documents were held liable to the investors for misstatements in those
documents under common law negligence principles as well as under
Section 10(b). And in Koehlerv. Pulvers,58 while the lawyer defendant was
held not liable under Section 10(b) due to a lack of scienter, he was held
liable to investors on their common law malpractice claims for failing to
uncover and disclose fraud in the documents he drafted for his client.5 9
The courts' findings that attorney malpractice clais could be asserted
by non-client investors in Employers Insurance of Wausau and Koehler
were predicated on the same view that led to their findings that primary
Section 10(b) claims couldbe asserted-that attorneys undertake disclosure
duties to investors by participating in the preparation of securities offering
documents. Similarly, other courts that have rejected Section 10(b) claims
against attorneys on the ground that no duty to investors is undertaken by
the mere drafting of offering documents have rejected malpractice claims
on the same basis.
5

See id. at *34 n.8.
*38-39.
17 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 871 F Supp. 381,
388-89 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
58Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F Supp. 829 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
59 See id. at 848-49.
56Id. at
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For example, in Buford White Lumber Co. ProfitShanng andSavings
Plan & Trust v. Octagon Properties,othe court rejected a common law
malpractice claim onthe same basis as it rejected the primary Section 10(b)
claim against a lawyer-that lawyers who draft offering documents owe no
duties to investors unless those documents contain opinions that the
attorneys have themselves issued and signed.6 Similarly, in Austin v.
Bradley, Bany & Tarlow, P.C.,62 the court rejected a common law
malpractice claim on the same basis as it rejected a Section 10(b) claim
against the lawyer defendants - that because any duty by the issuer's
attorney to disclose information to investors would conflict with that
attorney's duty to his client, the attorney could not be held to owe a duty
of disclosure to the investors.63
The foregoing cases plainly demonstrate that the fate of common law
negligence claims brought by investors against lawyers who draft offering
documents turns upon the same issue as determines the outcome of postCentral Bank of Denver Section 10(b) claims against those lawyers whether the lawyers owe a duty to the investors. To the extent that the
desire to preserve Section 10(b) attorney liability encourages courts to find
the existence of such a duty, CentralBankofDenver's effect might well be
to expand attorney liability in common law negligence claims. 64
6 Buford White Lumber Co. Profit Sharing and Say. Plan & Trust v. Octagon
Properties, Ltd., 740 F Supp. 1553 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
61

See id. at 1563-64.

6 Austin v. Bradley, Barry & Tarlow, P.C., 836 F Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1993).
63 See id. at 38-39. Conversely,
in Fortson v. Winstead,McGuire, Sechrest &
Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 473-74 (4th Cir. 1992), the court looked to the applicable
state law ofattorey malpractice to determine whether an attorney engaged to draft
a tax opinion could be liable to investors under Section 10(b) for failing to disclose
information material to other portions of the issuer clients' private placement
memorandum. Because the controlling law in that case (Texas law) limited the
attorneys' duties of disclosure to those in direct pnvity with the attorney, i.e., lus
clients, the Fortson court held that a Section 10(b) omissions claim would not lie.
" Potential liability under state blue sky statutes must also be considered. In
states like Kentucky that have adopted the civil liabilities provision of the Uniform
Securities Act of 1956, liability for misstatements or omissions in offering
documents extends, interalia,to "every
agent who materially aids in the sale
"KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 292A80(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1995). Sellers and their
"agents" are liable unless they can prove that they were unaware and could not
reasonably have become aware of the misstatements or omissions. See id. §
292.310(2), which defines "agent" as a party who "represents
[the] issuer in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities." Most courts to
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Im. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
UNDERLYING THE JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
A. Ethical Considerations
One of the principal objections to holding issuer's counsel responsible
for disclosing material facts about their clients' securities offerings is that
it would subvert the attorney's role as advocate and protector of client
confidences. In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,65 the Fifth Circuit
explained its unwillingness to extend the securities lawyer's duties to thirdparty investors because of its view that to do so would compromise the
lawyer's ethical duty to devote his undivided loyalty to the client6
While the concerns raised by the Abell court are compelling in cases
where a lawyer with knowledge of negative information concerning his
clients' offering plays no role in preparing misleading offering documents,
attempts to invoke legal ethical duties to justify a lawyer's conduct m
knowingly preparing materially misleading solicitation documents are not
likely to sway many courts. As noted above, the courts have almost
consider the question have concluded that lawyers who merely draft their clients
offering documents - or even issue and sign formal opinions contained in those
documents - cannot be held liable because they are not agents of the seller. See
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ind. 1989), appealdismissed922
F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1991); Allen v. Columbia Fin. Management, Ltd., 377 S.E.2d
352 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988); Rendler v. Markos, 453 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990); see also Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983)
(involving CPA who issued audit opinion). But see Powell v. H.E.F Partnership,
835 F Supp. 762 (D. Vt. 1993) (stating that law firm that prepared offering
documents was agent of seller and thus liable under Vermont Securities Act as
having aided seller notwithstanding that law firm never solicited sales or met with
potential purchasers). Because: (1) the duties of an issuer's counsel generally do
not encompass the power to alter the legal relations between the principals and
third parties, which the Restatement (Second) of Agency states is an essential
characteristic of agency, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY §§ 12-14(1957);
and (2) professional liability under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771 (1994) (upon which the civil liabilities provision of the Uniform Securities
Act has been closely patterned), was sharply curtailed by the Supreme Court ruling
in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), it is not likely that many courts will
construe the civil liabilities section of the Uniform Securities Act to cover lawyers
performing
the typical functions of issuer's counsel.
65
Abell v Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988).
66
See Id. at 1124.
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unanmnously rejected attempts to impose so-calledwhistle blower liability
upon attorneys who have performed legal services unrelated to the
solicitation ofthe securities transaction orthepreparation ofthe solicitation
documents. Once the attorney undertakes to assist his client in preparing
solicitation materials, however, the ethical imperatives clearly shift. There
is no ethical mandate permitting lawyers to knowingly prepare solicitation
documents that contain material misrepresentations or omissions of fact.
To the contrary, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct preclude
attorneys from assisting in client fraud.67 Courts have quite properly held
that "a lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with
regard to securities which he knows to be false siply because Ins client
has furished it to him. 6 8
B. Due Diligence Considerations
While courts have not and ought not waste their concern on the plight
of a securities lawyer who knowingly drafts materially misleading offering
documents, far more significant policy inplications are raised by
subjecting lawyers engaged to draft those documents to liability to
investors for unwittingly failing to ferret out their client's fraud. To protect
against such liability, an issuer's counsel would be forced to independently
confirm and corroborate virtually all the information that the client
provides. The securities lawyer's due diligence function would be
converted from a role designed to protect clients from liability to investors
67

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1996).

61SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968). The interesting ethical
dilemma arises where the attorney only learns after he has completed his
participation inthe drafting process that the offering documents contain fraudulent
misstatements. Rule 1.6 would seem, at the very least, to require the lawyer to
withdraw from the representation. Moreover, while Rule 1.6 generally prohibits
disclosure of client confidences to prevent the commission of a fraud, the ABA
Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Responsibility has concluded that
an innocent lawyer who recognizes after the fact that the papers he has drafted
contain misrepresentations communicated to hun by the client could rectify the
situation by withdrawing from the now fraudulent representation and disavowing
the offending papers. See ABA Comm. on Ethicsand ProfessionalResponsibility
Formal Op. 92-366 (1992); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 1.6:306 (Supp. 1996) (concluding that Rule 1.6(b)(2) can be
construed to allow lawyers in such situations to engage in so-called "pre-emptive"
self-defense and disclose material facts that were omitted from the offering
documents in order to avoid becoming entangled in future proceedings).
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for negligent oversights to a function designed to protect the public (and
ultimately the lawyer) from the client's misstatements.
Tins is certainly a far cry from the statutory underpinnings of due
diligence - let alone how the lawyers' due diligence role has traditionally
been perceived by members of the securities bar. Pursuant to section 11 of
the 1933 Securities Act, 69 statutory sellers of securities are primafacie
liable to investors for all material misstatements in the registration
statement. Pursuant to section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, similar
liability attaches to unintentional misrepresentations contained in a private
placement memorandum. To avoid liability, statutory sellers (officers,
directors, general partners, etc.) must establish, by way of affirmative
defense, that they have made a "reasonable investigation" and had
"reasonable grounds to believe and did believe" that the offering
documents contained only true statements. 0 Consistent with the statutory
scheme, the securities lawyer's role has traditionally been viewed as
assisting clients in establishing such a defense against potential claims by
investors - not to protect the investors from his clients' fraud.7'
Yet while most securities lawyers do not view their role in the due
diligence process as serving the interests of investors, that is precisely how
many courts have viewed the due diligence function of securities counsel.
What started out as a defense designed to benefit the issuer client has been
converted to a duty imposed upon the issuer's lawyer.
In the seminal case of SEC v. Spectrum Ltd.,' Judge Kaufman referred to what he considered as the important role played by securities
counsel in protecting the public from unscrupulous practices in the
securities markets:
The securities laws provide a myriad of safeguards designed to protect the
interest of the investing public. Effective implementation of these
69 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
70 1d. § 77k(b)(3)(A), (B); see also id. § 77(2).
71 For
example, lawyers faced with clients unwilling or unable to shoulder the
substantial costs of a thorough attorney due diligence investigation into the subject
of the investment scheme traditionally have discharged their duties by advising
clients of the potential risks of failure to conduct a reasonable due diligence
investigation. To the extent the lawyers are held responsible for the veracity of the
information their clients supply for inclusion in the offering documents, however,
such an approach is msufficient to protect the lawyers from claims brought by
investors.
72SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
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safeguards, however, depends in large measure on the members of the bar
who serve in an advisory capacity to those engaged in securities
transactions. 3
Consistent with this view, many courts have expressly found that lawyers
who undertake to draft their clients' securities offering documents thereby
undertake special due diligence obligations for the benefit of the investing
public.74
73
7

Id. at 536.

' 4 See Escort v. BarChns Const. Corp.,

283 F Supp. 643,690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
BarChnsaddressed the liability of a statutory seller, a director of the issuer who
signed the registration statement This defendant, Grant, was an outside director
and attorney who claimed to have been misled by his client as to the accuracy of
the registration statement documents. The court noted that, although he was not
being sued as a lawyer, the fact that he was a lawyer affected the degree of
diligence he was required to show in order to establish his due diligence defense:
"As the directormost directly concerned with writing the registration statement and
assuring its accuracy, more was required from hum in the way of reasonable
investigation than could fairly be expected of a director who had no connection
with ns work." Id. In rejecting Grant's argument that an attorney in this situation
was entitled to rely on the representations of his client without verifying the
accuracy of these statements, the court opined:
This is too broad a generalization. It is all a matter of degree. To require an
audit [by the attorney] would obviously be unreasonable. On the other hand,
to require a check of matters easily verifiable is not unreasonable. Even
honest clients can make mistakes. The statute imposes liability for untrue
statements regardless of whether they are intentionally untrue. The way to
prevent mistakes is to test all information by examining the original written
record.
Id.Because Grant could easily have verified errors in the record yet failed to do so,
Grant's due diligence affirmative defense on client-supplied information was
rejected.
In announcing its decision, the BarChnscourt expressly stated that Grant was
iot held liable as a lawyer "Grant is sued as a director and a signer of the
•egistration statement This is not an action against him for malpractice in his
apacity as a lawyer." Id. Nonetheless, cases such as Felts, Seidel, and Koehler
ave relied upon BarChns to establish a generalized duty of attorneys to
ivestigate the accuracy of offering documents, which duty, if not fuiffiled, could
ad to the imposition of primary Section 10(b) liability and common law
.gligence liability upon attorneys who draft those documents. See Felts v.
ational Accounts Sys. Ass'n, 469 F Supp. 54,67 (N.D. Miss. 1978) ("The duty
a lawyer includes the obligation to exercise due diligence, including a reasonable
lity, in connection with the responsibilities he has voluntarily undertaken.");
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As long as courts view an issuer's counsel's due diligence function m
such a fashion, securities lawyers will continue to face primary Section
10(b) and common law negligence liability to investors for misstatements
or omissions contained in the offering documents they draft for their
clients. Indeed, this asserted obligation of securities counsel, to undertake
due diligence for the benefit of investors, is far more than just a
consequence of the judicial precedents holding attorneys liable to investors
for failing to detect and disclose their clients' fraud - it provides an
important basis for such liability.
As noted before, the primary obstacle investors face m asserting
primary Section 10(b) and common law negligence claims against lawyers
who merely draft offering documents for their issuer clients is establishing
the existence of a duty running from lawyers to investors. Assuming the
existence of a duty of investor protection based on the obligation of due
diligence, courts need look no further in order to find a duty owed from
issuer's counsel to the investors.
The supposed obligation of due diligence owed by securities counsel
to investors has been expressly relied upon by the courts in Felts, Koehler,
and Sezdel as the basis for finding that lawyers who draft offering
documents containing material omissions can be held primarily liable to
investors for those omissions under Section 10(b). Similarly this view of
the lawyer's due diligence function was the basis of the Ronson court's
finding that to recognize a duty of disclosure from issuer's counsel to
investors would not conflict with that lawyer's ethical duties to Ins client.
Indeed, because, according to the Ronson court, the purpose behind the
representation of issuer's counsel is to serve a goal common to both his
client and investors, i.e., to promote full disclosure, investors are among the
intended beneficiaries of the issuer's lawyer's services. 5
FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on othei
grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (In its high specialty field, O'Melveny owed a dup.
of due care "to make a 'reasonable, independent investigation [of its clients
financial condition and] to detect and correct false and misleading materials."
(quoting Felsi 469 F Supp. at 67). Other courts, including the Second Circm
have viewed the lawyer's duty to conduct "some sort of independent investigatic
of the facts supplied by [the client]" as providing the basis for the finding
recklessness necessary to support a Section 10(b) clam against the lawyer. S
Breardv. Sachnoff& Weaver, 941 F.2d 142,144 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Goldni
v. McMahan, Brafinan, Morgan & Co., 706 F Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 198
("An egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, may
some cases give rise to an inference of gross negligence winch can be
functional equivalent of recklessness.").
I Tins view that issuer's counsel undertakes special duties of investigation,
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Under the more traditional view of the due diligence function held by

most securities lawyers, there is no such common goal. The role of
securities lawyers vis-a-vis investors is no different that the role of any
other lawyer vis-a-vis the party on the other side of the transaction from Ins
client. The due diligence undertaking - quite to the contrary of protecting
the investors rights - is designed to protect the client from potential claims
by investors. Viewed in this fashion, the court's holding in Austin v.
Bradley, Barry & Tarlow, P.C., which rejected any duty by a law firm to
investors to uncover misstatements m the disclosure documents they draft
for their clients (because such duty would conflict with the lawyer's
obligations to his client)76 makes perfect sense.
CONCLUSION

The issue of whether lawyers hired to draft their clients securities
offering documents can be held liable to investors under Section 10(b)
remains a very open issue, notwithstanding the elimination of aider-andabetter liability by CentralBankofDenver.Moreover, developments in the
common law affording standing in attomeymalpractice cases to non-clients
raise the spectre that issuer's counsel will be held liable to investors for
simple negligence in failing to detect or correct misstatements in their
clients' offering documents. Until these issues are clarified by the courts,
lawyers like Carolyn Counselorhiredto draft securities offering documents
would be well served to scrutinize all information supplied by their clients
for inclusion in the offering documents - if not for the benefit of the
investing public then at least for the benefit of their malpractice carriers.

disclosure when they draft offering documents could explain why - when offering
documents are involved - the courts have deviated from the view that "lawyers do
not vouch for the probity of their clients when they draft documents reflecting their
clients' promises, statements or warranties." Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485,
495 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992). See also Barker v.
Henderson Franklin Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1986); In re
Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig., 840 F Supp. 1558, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
76 See supra note

19.

